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Chapter 1 — Introduction 
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate and attempt to understand some ways 
in which humor and comedy operate with the particular goal of showing how incongruity 
theory explains why people find certain types of situations or experiences amusing. Many 
others writing on the philosophy of humor have remarked on the seemingly 
insurmountable difficulty of producing a comprehensive theory of humor. The sheer 
number and variety of situations capable of precipitating amusement has, throughout 
history, rendered every attempt at a formulating a foundational theory of humor 
ultimately unsuccessful; some are too austere and fail to account for the wide range of 
humorous situations while others are far too broad, allowing non-humorous situations to 
meet their criteria for the presence of humor.  
 Given the apparent elusiveness of the fundamental nature of humor, this thesis is 
not in the business of asserting a fundamental theory of comedy. Rather, I will present a 
popular and fairly successful account of humor most commonly referred to as incongruity 
theory. I will examine the strengths of this account according to a modern formulation of 
incongruity theory as well as formulations set forth by Kant and Schopenhauer in the 
18th and 19th centuries. I will show that incongruity theory provides a relatively reliable 
framework for analyzing humor in spite of several important criticisms I will level 
against it. Finally, I will examine the relationship between humor as described by 
incongruity theory, reason, and the brand of philosophical absurdity identified by Thomas 
Nagel (1972). By applying incongruity theory to foundational yet persistently 




humor not only bears a close relationship to these issues but that humor also serves as a 
means by which we can engage and cope with the unsolvable nature of these problems.  
 Though humor and comedy have historically received relatively little attention as 
areas of philosophical study, the existing body of work addressing them is promising and 
warrants further investigation; humans, after all, spend a great deal of time and money in 
search of amusement. The relationship between laughter and the perception of humor, 
however, is less straightforward than many historical theories of humor seem account for. 
We laugh when we perceive humor, to be certain. But we laugh just as readily out of 
nervousness, relief, scorn, intoxication, etc. By conflating theories of humor with theories 
of laughter, many philosophers have unnecessarily complicated, and in some cases fatally 
damaged, their work. It is plain to see that there are many cases in which a person can 
perceive humor and be amused by it without laughing. Conversely, there are many cases 
in which laughter is not caused by experiencing something funny. It is very likely that 
strong and interesting connections exist between laughter of all types (humorous and non-
humorous alike), but attempting to understand humor by working backwards from 
laughter to the thing that causes laughter is doomed to fail; the situations and events that 
precipitate non-humorous laughter are simply too numerous and varied to account for. To 
this point, consider how inefficient it would seem to make an inquiry into the nature of 
sadness by first trying to explain what types of things make us cry.  
 Incongruity theory, in many cases, is presented as a theory of laughter. As a 
matter of fact, it is capable of explaining laughter as a reaction to a variety of situations, 
humorous and otherwise. Nonetheless, it is my contention that there is very little to be 




Given that humor— as opposed to laughter—is the domain of this paper, I have modified 
incongruity theory from an explanation of human laughter into theory that explains (a) 
why certain things have the potential to be funny and (b) why people find certain things 
funny. For the sake of concision and clarity, from here forward any mention of laughter 
(unless otherwise noted) should be taken as a reference to the physical expression of 






Chapter 2 - Incongruity Theory 
 
 The term 'incongruity theory' refers to a group of philosophical accounts of humor 
that posit the perception of incongruity as the source of amusement. Though it is not 
entirely flawless, incongruity theory stands as one of the most prominent accounts of 
amusement in the contemporary discussion of philosophy of humor. Incongruity theory 
operates in two ways. First, and most importantly, it explains why people react with 
laughter in a very wide range of situations (including, as mentioned in the introduction, 
some which are not funny). In other words, incongruity theory provides an explanation 
for why humans find certain things funny. Second, it provides an explanation of what 
makes a situation itself funny. This explanatory versatility is an attractive feature of 
incongruity theory. In this chapter, I will provide a rough sketch of incongruity theory 
and then complicate it to provide a more nuanced and accurate account. Incongruity 
theory essentially posits that people feel amused when they have an experience that 
violates the normal order of things according to their own subjective understanding of 
what the normal order of things is. Incongruity theory relies on the premise that in their 
daily lives (that is, outside the philosophy seminar room), most people believe that the 
world is ordered; they believe that objects behave and interact with other objects in a 
consistent manner, that actions have consistent results. We perceive humor and are 
amused, according to incongruity theory, when we are presented with an experience that 
is incongruous with what we understand to be the normal order of things. A politician's 
pants falling down as he is receiving an award; the village drunk saving the day 




the accidental meaning taken seriously as the intended meaning, are all examples of 
funny violations of the normal order of things. These violations can also include 
disruptions of causal chains and the flawed use of logic (many jokes, in fact, can be 
boiled down to elaborate examples of logical fallacies). Other times, we are amused 
simply by people behaving in ways that are incongruous with their title or position in 
society like the infamous photo of George W. Bush in a flight-suit or a monkey wearing a 
tuxedo.   
 It is important to make clear that incongruity theory is a subject-dependent theory 
of humor. Different people have different understandings of what constitutes the 'normal 
order', so an experience that seems humorously incongruous to one person might not 
seem so funny to another. Though incongruity theory explains that the presence of an 
incongruity gives a situation the potential to be amusing, funniness is a property that is 
perceived subjectively. If a person perceives an incongruity, they may find that 
incongruity amusing. A different subject, however, might not find that same situation 
incongruous, and therefore would likely not be amused. This accounts for different senses 
of humor across cultural backgrounds, education, religious beliefs, etc.  
 
 
What is an Incongruity? 
 If we are to seriously consider incongruity theory's potential to explain humor, we 
must understand what exactly is being referred to by the word "incongruity". John 
Morreall (2011) and Robert Latta (1999) among others have pointed out that many 




'incongruity' and 'incongruous'. In order to avoid such pitfalls, we ought to spell out a 
careful definition of the type of incongruity for which incongruity theory is named.  
 It is exceedingly tempting to attempt to define an incongruous situation or 
occurrence by reference to words with meanings that are closely related to incongruity 
but have slightly different connotations. Terms like 'absurd', 'illogical', 'out of context', 
'unexpected', 'ludicrous', 'ridiculous', or 'inappropriate' are often invoked to describe a 
humorous incongruity, but they are ultimately inaccurate and unwieldy (Morreall, 
"Comic Relief", loc. 405). That is not to say that a humorous incongruity cannot be 
absurd or illogical, in fact many are, but what is meant by incongruity in the context of a 
discussion of humor is better described as a mismatch between a subject's conceptual 
understanding of how an action ought to happen, an event ought to unfold, or an object 
ought to appear, and a particular experience that contradicts this conceptual 
understanding. John Morreall (2011) describes the fundamental meaning of "incongruity" 
as it is used in incongruity theories as what occurs when, "some thing or event we 
perceive or think about violates our normal mental patterns and normal expectations."  
(Loc. 405). It is not quite right to describe an incongruity simply as something 
"unexpected". Rather, the incongruous object or event must clash with the systems of 
thought we use to generate expectations about the outcomes of our and others' actions. 
These systems can be understood as conceptual patterns used to organize, synthesize, and 
understand our experiences.  
 These conceptual patterns develop in response to our interactions with our 
material and social environment. Informed by experience, they are the mechanism by 




expectations, in turn, guide our actions. More often than not, such thought patterns work 
remarkably well—so well, in fact, that we hardly notice them. I expect to feel heat if I 
extend my bare hand towards a campfire; when passing an oncoming stranger on the 
sidewalk, I expect that they will simply stroll past me, not suddenly extend their leg to 
trip me; when watching a cheesy romantic comedy it is reasonable for me to expect, 
based on my previous experiences with the genre, that the 'nice guy' will get the girl. 
These relatively simple examples serve to illustrate the principle, but it is important to 
emphasize the complexity and sophistication of these processes. Many of our conceptual 
patterns overlap and interact with each other. Furthermore, these conceptual patterns are 
constantly synthesizing incredible amounts of sensory data and accounting for countless 
variables. In the course of any given conversation, for instance, we form expectations for 
the progression of the interaction based on innumerable factors such as previous 
conversations, body language, tone of voice, knowledge about the person we are talking 
with, conversations we've had with people who seem similar to the person we're talking 
with, and myriad others. Some conceptual patterns are more reliable than others, but for 
the most part they provide us with a highly reliable framework for interacting with our 
environment. An incongruous event or object disrupts these ordinarily reliable conceptual 
patterns. This disruption, when combined with some other conditions, is liable to amuse 
us. These other conditions, of course, are extremely important in terms of human 
perception of humor. A conceptual incongruity itself is not sufficient for amusement. If, 
for example, I reach towards a fire and feel cold, I most likely won’t be amused. I will 




pages but first I would like to dwell for a moment on incongruity itself and its function in 
the amusement-reaction as a necessary condition for our perception of humor.  
 
Incongruity Theory at Work 
 Before diving into an in-depth analysis of incongruity theory, let's illustrate the 
account by showing how it can explain the funniness of a handful of short jokes. Here's 
an old standby that strikes me as pretty amusing.   
An 80 year-old man goes into the confessional and tells the priest,  
"Father, I am an 80 year-old man, I'm married, I have 4 children and 11 
grandchildren. Last night I strayed and had an affair with two beautiful 23 
year-old girls. We partied and made love all night long."  
 The priest says, "This is very serious, my son. When was the last 
time you were at confession?" 
 The old man says, "Well, Father,  I'm Jewish. So I've never been to 
confession before." 
 The priest says, "You're Jewish? Then why are you here telling me 
this?" 
 "I'm telling everyone!" 
 
It's relatively straightforward to see how incongruity theory explains why many people 
find this joke amusing. In the West, at least, there are certain widely-held conceptual 
patterns governing the understanding of the institution of marriage and the sanctity and 
sobriety of the confessional as a religious space. We also understand the stereotypical 
sexual appeal of two beautiful young women to an old man who is long past his sexual 
peak. What this joke does, however, is show how the old man has, according to the norms 
of western society, incorrectly ordered the importance of sexual desire, religious 
austerity, and the sanctity of his marriage. The carelessness and glee with which he cheats 
on his wife strikes those of us who find this joke funny as incongruous. Furthermore, the 




about his sexual conquests is incongruous in virtue of the very nature of Catholic 
confession, an institution commonly associated with sincerity, guilt, and forgiveness. 
Finally, and perhaps most amusingly, is the incongruity between our conceptual 
understanding of the confessional as a place that is absolutely private and personal and 
the old man's use of it as just another place to "tell everybody".  
 In simpler jokes, the incongruities at play are even more straight forward 
and easily visible. This pun, for instance: At a nudist colony for communists, two 
gentlemen are sitting naked on the porch. One turns to the other and says, "I say 
old boy, have you read Marx?" To which his comrade replies, "Yes... I think it's 
these wicker chairs." (Keillor, 28). This joke, like almost all puns, simply trades 
on a miscommunication in which one meaning of a homophone is intended by the 
speaker but a different meaning is heard. This kind of miscommunication is easily 
understood as a semantic incongruity. The audience, along with the first 
communist in the joke is under the impression that the second communist's 
answer will be something about Marx or political theory in general. His response 
about wicker chairs, however, is incongruous in light of the intended meaning of 
the question.  
 Here is one more example of joke that exploits a relatively straightforward 
humorous incongruity: 
This guy walks into a pub, sits down, and says, “Give me two beers, I've had a 
rough day at work.”  
 The bartender says, “Sorry to hear that, what do you do?”  
 The guy says, “I take care of the corgis— you know, the dogs the royal 
family owns.”  
 The bartender says, “Tough job, huh?”  
 The guy says, “Well, all that inbreeding has led to low intelligence and 






 This joke operates by exploiting the differences between the linguistic 
conventions we use to talk about people and those we use to talk about dogs.  In many 
cases using the terms "inbreeding", "low intelligence", and "bad temperament" to 
describe a family of dogs is perfectly acceptable. However, we don't ordinarily use this 
type of language in reference to a family of humans (let alone the royal family). By using 
dog breeding terms to describe a family (even if the family is being accurately described), 
the dog breeder in this joke presents a humorous incongruity to the bartender and to the 
audience of the joke. 
 In some cases, however, there are many layers of incongruity at play. It is 
particularly difficult to parse jokes that contain incongruities relative to several 
conceptual patterns. This (by now) classic joke about a small-town rabbi, for example, 
contains incongruities strictly within its story as well as incongruities between events 
described in the story and the normal order of things in real life. This version of the joke 
is taken from Ted Cohen (1999): 
 After many days of hard, continuous rain, the river is in danger of flooding, and 
word goes out that people may have to abandon their homes. When the river 
crests, water pours through the town, inundating houses, and it continues to rise. 
Firemen are sent in a small motorboat to go through the streets to make sure 
everyone is leaving. When they come to the house of the rabbi, they find him 
standing knee-deep in water on his front porch. 
   “Come on, Rabbi,” say the firemen. “The river will go much higher, and 
you should leave with us.”  
  “No,” says the rabbi. “God will protect me.”  
  And he sends them away. The river rises higher, the rabbi is forced to go 
up to the second floor of his house, and now the police come in a motor launch.  
  “Come on, Rabbi,” say the police, “there isn’t much time.”  
  “No,” insists the rabbi. “I will stay right here. God will look after me.”  
 And he sends them away.  Now the river rises so high that the rabbi is forced to 
stand on the roof of his house. When the National Guard arrive in a large boat, 




have been a man of faith, and I will stay now, and trust in God,” and sends them 
away.  
  The river rises, the rabbi is swept away, and the rabbi drowns. Forthwith 
the rabbi appears in heaven, where he angrily approaches the throne of God, 
demanding, “How can You have let this happen to me? For all my life I have kept 
Your mitzvot. I have done what You asked, and trusted in You. Why?”  
  A voice sounds from the throne: “You shmuck, I sent three boats!” (20) 
 
 If we find this story funny, we do so, according to incongruity theory, in virtue of 
a discrepancy between the behavior of the characters as described in the joke and our 
conceptually produced expectations for how those characters ought to behave. Note that 
the joke's set up is written in such a way as to imitate the affect and cadence of the 
religious parables with which Western audiences are so familiar. It features a small town, 
a dramatic and unanticipated weather event, and spiritual leader who is willing to 
sacrifice his life to prove his faith; were it not for the punch-line, this joke would read as 
the beginning of a perfectly serious religious story. As the joke is told, the audience 
develops an expectation for its ending based on their previous story-hearing experiences. 
This process leads us to expect that upon the rabbi's arrival in heaven God will reward 
him for his faith or offer a piece of divine wisdom. Instead, we are given a description of 
God calling a lifelong spiritual devotee a "schmuck". This depiction clashes with our 
normal way of thinking about God and this incongruity, in turn, is amusing. 
 There is, however, a deeper incongruity at play. The joke would still be funny if 
the "schmuck" line were cut. Many of us familiar with the mythology of the Judeo-
Christian tradition have come to associate the omnipotence of God with supernatural acts. 
We understand divine intervention to be marked (as it is in many religious texts) by 
unexplainable phenomena; boats and firefighters are not sent by God, we think, they are 




water-into-wine, burning-bush style miracles we've learned to expect from holy 
interventions and the lackluster but ultimately more practical deliverance offered by God 
in the story, is at the core of what we find amusing about this joke.  The audience that 
finds this joke amusing does so not because the punch-line is simply unexpected or 
absurd, but because what is delivered in the punch-line violates a conceptual pattern with 
which the audience is familiar. The humorous effect of this tension is compound by the 
rabbi's character, whose funniness derives from his embodiment of the incongruity noted 
above; he is a deeply faithful man, but his conceptual understanding of the way God 
ought to act prevents him from being able to recognize the act of God unfolding right 
before his eyes.   
 In this respect, incongruity theory can present a slightly tricky analytical 
challenge. For any given instance of amusement—after hearing the rabbi joke, for 
example—we are presented with the problem of identifying, from a number of potentially 
humorous incongruities, the incongruity responsible for amusing us. Is the incongruity 
simply contained within the joke, between what happens in the joke and what ordinarily 
happens in situations akin to the joke's set up? Is it between what actually happens and 
what the audience expects will happen? Or does the joke bring out some incongruity in 
the audiences own beliefs about how God might act—why couldn't, for example, the 
arrival of the three boats be taken as proof of God's existence? Answering this particular 
question can be very difficult, particularly because the answer seems to be that it is a 
combination of some kind.  
 In some cases of amusement, the humorous incongruity is easy to spot. Puns, for 




word or term is usually used in a certain context and a different connotation of the same 
word/phrase or a homophone. For instance, "I'm terribly afraid of escalators, so I'm 
taking steps to avoid them". The incongruity at play in this quip is quite simple and easily 
recognizable. When we talk about "taking steps to avoid a problem" we tend to assume 
that we are taking about a plan of action used to steer clear of whatever it is that we want 
to avoid. In this case, however, "taking steps" refers literally to walking up a set of stairs 
to avoid engaging with something the speaker is afraid of, namely, escalators. 
Nonetheless, jokes like the rabbi joke that draw out an incongruity between a relatively 
unquestioned belief held by the audience and the possibility that that belief is unfounded 
seem to strike us as the most funny, insightful, and brilliant jokes out there; reflecting on 
this joke prompts us to wonder if maybe we should be seeing acts of God everywhere in 
our daily lives. And, like the rabbi joke, these are the jokes that tend to get told over and 
over again. I will address this contention in much greater detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Repeated Amusement 
 Some will surely object, however, that even though the rabbi joke is set up to 
imitate a non-funny story, anyone hearing it will surely know from the outset that they 
are listening to a joke. If this is true, how can we be amused by the incongruity; if 
incongruity theory is true, shouldn't any joke's funniness be neutralized by the audience 
knowing that they are hearing a joke? This point, which is important and certainly worth 
considering, is ultimately untenable. If we know that we are being told a joke, we can 
nonetheless appreciate the joke's funniness by recognizing that it still violates conceptual 




the incongruity presented by the violation, can still be funny. To feel amused, it is not 
necessary that we be surprised by an incongruity, an incongruity must simply be present. 
The presence of an incongruity gives a situation or event the potential to amuse, the 
perception of an incongruity in certain contexts causes us to feel amused. For this reason 
it is important to emphasize that humorous incongruities do not simply consist in ‘the 
unexpected’. To the contrary, we are often amused while explicitly holding the 
expectation that we will be amused. No one goes to a comedy club expecting to hear a 
series of short, serious stories, for instance (although, as I will show in the coming 
paragraphs, such an experience might amuse us), and we often preface joke-telling by 
announcing our intentions. We expect to be amused in these situations, and therefore, 
whether we realize it or not, expect to be presented with a story that is humorously 
incongruous. We are often amused at times when we expect to be amused. Surprise, 
therefore, is not a necessary condition of amusement (although it often seems to help). It 
is, rather, recognizing that a conceptual pattern has been or is being violated that amuses 
us. 
 The fact that we need only recognize a conceptual violation—rather than being 
surprised by a conceptual violation—in order to be amused serves to explain why we can 
find the same thing funny more than once. Though we never seem to find a joke as funny 
as when we first heard it (independent of the objective potential funniness of the joke), 
we nonetheless find ourselves constantly amused by jokes, movies, episodes of TV 
shows, etc. that we've experienced time and time again. This is possible because we 
recognize the violation of a conceptual pattern even if we already know how and when it 




funny and be (at least somewhat) amused by it because the incongruity between the 
action in the joke and a given conceptual pattern is still present. However, as is the case 
with all experiences, repeated exposure to jokes both fresh and familiar leads us to 
develop certain conceptual patterns for understanding and appreciating humor. We 
become less and less impressed with "simple" or "silly" jokes because they slowly stop 
presenting a dramatic enough break with our conceptual patterns (consider how the form 
of the generic knock-knock joke has become, for the most part, too familiar to amuse us 
in any significant sense). While this dynamic has lead to increasingly elegant and clever 
jokes structured in conventional ways (e.g. a woman walks into a bar and orders a 
double entendre, so the bartender gives it to her), it also has engendered a host of jokes 
and comedic styles that use violations of the conceptual patterns governing joke-hearing 
to generate amusement (sticking with the knock-knock theme, consider the ubiquitous 
'interrupting cow' variation). This latter category of jokes might accurately be considered 
metahumor, as they are often jokes about jokes or jokes about the structure of jokes.  
 
Metahumor: Jokes About Jokes, Anti-Jokes, Shaggy Dog Stories 
 Incongruity theory is appealing as a theory of humor in virtue of its ability to 
explain why audiences, especially contemporary audiences, are so amused by jokes that 
violate the conventions of traditional joke-telling. This kind of humor can work in a 
number of ways. Some of these jokes violate our normal conceptual patterns by adhering 
to standard joke structure—thereby leading an audience familiar with joke-telling to 
expect a certain kind of disruption to their normal conceptual patterns in the punch-line—




the audience's normal conceptual patterns. These jokes are sometimes called 'anti-jokes'. 
Many such jokes are childish and are often circulated by young people who have fairly 
recently become accustomed to the standard patterns used in joke construction ("what's 
the difference between...", "What do you call a...", "Knock, knock...", "A man walks into 
a bar...", "How many x does it take to change a light bulb?" etc.). Take this joke, which 
was quite popular in my 5th grade class, for instance. "What's brown and sticky? A stick." 
The punch-line here isn't a clever pun, it isn't a double-entendre, it doesn't violate our 
normal conceptual patterns in any significant sense except for the conceptual pattern we 
have associated with jokes that start with questions like "what's brown and sticky?" The 
punch-line, in fact, is funny only because it is a perfectly literal and painfully obvious 
answer to the question posed in the set up; it is incongruous because the audience often 
expects, based on the normal conceptual patterns associated with joke-telling, an 
unexpected twist in the punch-line. It turns out, of course, that an unexpected twist is 
delivered, it's just that it is unexpected in an unexpected way, so to speak.  Consider some 
other examples from the schoolyard: "Why did the monkey fall out of the tree? Because it 
was dead. Why did the second monkey fall out of the tree? Because it was tied to the first 
one." Or, "When geese fly in V formation, why is one side is always longer than the 
other? Because that side has more geese on it." Once again, these punch-lines are only 
funny because they are so obviously not the kind of statements that ordinarily constitute 
punch-lines. Furthermore, and more importantly, the punch-lines in these jokes do not 
bear the kind of relationship to their set-ups that our normal conceptual patterns instruct 
us to expect between set-ups and punch-lines. In these cases, we perceive funniness 




virtue of conventional joke-telling practice. This, as opposed to more traditional cases in 
which the incongruity is between the joke itself and the conceptual patterns we have 
concerning some activity, object or event described in the joke. Here are some more 
widely circulated examples of jokes that play on the conventions of the "a man walks into 
a bar" formula: A priest, a rabbi, and Buddhist monk walk into a bar, the bartender looks 
up and says "what is this, some kind of joke?"; an Irishman walks past a bar; a man 
walks into a bar and says "ouch"; two men walk into a bar, the third one ducks; A blind 
man walks into a bar. And a table. And a chair; etc.   
 The 'anti' element of such anti-jokes can be pushed to the extreme for a somewhat 
different kind of humorous effect. For example, "What's worse than finding a worm in 
your apple...? The Holocaust." Though it is certainly in worse taste, this joke is somewhat 
similar structure to the stick joke above, but it also incorporates a categorical incongruity 
based on the way we qualify different levels of misfortune. The punch-line could easily 
be, "finding two worms in your apple" (which would put it in the same category as the 
stick joke and the geese joke), but by making the punch-line something so incalculably 
worse than a worm-ridden apple, the joke presents, in addition to the kind of incongruity 
presented by the stick and geese jokes, an incongruity between degrees of badness (of 
course the Holocaust is worse than finding a worm in your apple!). Furthermore, upon 
hearing the punch-line, the audience realizes that the answer could be any atrocity (e.g. 
"murder", "genocide", "the Bosnian civil war", "9/11", etc.); the punch-line only relates 
to the set up in the somewhat tenuous sense that both the set up and punch-line refer to 





 A similar dynamic is at play in the telling of "shaggy dog" jokes, in which the 
listener is given an exceedingly long and tedious set-up followed by a punch-line that is 
so trivial and dull that calling it a punch-line at all feels like a bit of a stretch. These 
jokes, while they certainly don't number among the funniest out there, are somewhat 
interesting because they boil down to nothing more than anti-climactic stories dressed up 
as jokes. The audience expects a joke and is given a boring, drawn-out story instead. A 
not-funny story presented as a joke can sometimes be funny in virtue of its violating the 
conceptual patterns we associate with joke telling. Incongruity theory is supported by this 
ability to provide us with a cogent explanation for why a joke might be 'so not funny that 
it's funny'.  
 However, there are also more sophisticated brands of metahumor that derive their 
funniness, at least in part, from violating the conventional structure of jokes. For 
example: What do you get when you cross a joke with a rhetorical question? When the 
listener inquires about the difference they are met with silence. If anyone is amused by 
this joke, they are amused by the incongruity between the conceptual pattern they usually 
use to make sense of "what do you get when you cross..." type jokes and this particular 
joke where the punch-line is cleverly embedded in the set-up. The ordinary joke formula, 
in which a set-up is followed by a punch-line that bears an incongruous relationship to 
the set-up, is violated by this joke; its success, rather, is based entirely on the incongruity 
between its unique structure and our understanding of how "what do you get when you..." 
jokes work. 
 Finally, I would like to address one last category of humorous incongruity, and 




brings out assumptions we make about the objectivity—or at least the authority of a given 
subjective viewpoint—of certain kinds of statements. By suggesting a viewpoint that is 
different from the audience's ordinary viewpoint, humor of altered perspective presents 
incongruity between the perspective from which we ordinarily experience a situation or 
event and a different, if equally valid, perspective with which we are unfamiliar or at 
least unused to adopting (Morreall, "Taking Laughter Seriously", 72). One such example 
is Oscar Wilde's reversal of the temperance movement's adage, "drink is the curse of the 
working class" into "work is the curse of the drinking class". I've heard a similar joke 
made by members of sports teams or other groups who say things like, "hockey gets in 
the way of my drinking team". This tactic is often used by comedians who render 
ordinary situations funny by examining them from unusual perspectives.  Jerry Seinfeld, 
a master of observational humor, does a bit in which he imagines what aliens might 
assume about the inter-species power dynamics on planet earth upon seeing people 
picking up after their dogs. 
On my block a lot of people walk their dogs, and I always see them 
walking around with their little 'poop bags', which to me is just the lowest 
function of human life. If aliens are watching this through telescopes 
they're going to think the dogs are the leaders.  If you see two life forms—
one of them is making a poop and other one is carrying it for them—who 
would you assume is in charge? (The Dog) 
 
By presenting a behavior as innocuous and ubiquitously accepted as picking up after a pet 
dog in a public place from the point of view of aliens who are unfamiliar with it, Seinfeld 
achieves a humorous effect. This kind of joke presents an incongruity between our 
unquestioned perception of a certain 'normal' behavior, and the possibility that said 
behavior is not, necessarily, such a normal thing to do. Such perspective switching is 




humorously absurd. A final example of humor based on altered perspective is the written 
joke:  
 Day 19 -  
 I have successfully conditioned my master to get up and write in his notebook 
 every time I drool. 
 -Pavlov's Dog.  
 
  
Other Factors in the Funniness of Incongruities 
 These joke examples serve to illustrate the range of situations and joke structures 
that operate in accordance with the tenets of incongruity theory. The perception of 
funniness in a great many cases can be coherently understood as resulting from the 
violation of normal conceptual patterns. As is likely self-evident given the variety of 
jokes presented in the preceding pages, there are many different shapes a humorous 
incongruity can take. I have discussed at some length the process through which we can 
be amused by an incongruity and how jokes take advantage of this by violating our 
conceptual patterns. This violation, however, can be delivered in a number of ways, via 
either jokes or humorous situations in day-to-day life. It is clear, however, that not all 
incongruities are humorous. To reuse an example from the introduction, if I were to reach 
toward fire and feel cold I would most likely not find the incident amusing. Mike Martin 
(1987) aptly points out that we find many incongruities pleasing but not amusing, citing 
surrealist art as an example (177). Another such example is the experience of observing a 
magician perform. If he is talented, the audience is bound to encounter innumerable 
incongruities (between their perceptions of the show and their conceptual understanding 




disappearing, women sawed in half then miraculously resurrected. Though we enjoy 
experiencing such incongruous events, it seems like a stretch to consider them funny per 
se, although it might be noted that we sometimes respond with non-humorous laughter in 
these situations. Additionally, many incongruous events or situations are neither amusing 
nor pleasurable, some are unsettling or uncomfortable while others can be downright 
distressing or traumatic. Missing a step while walking down a dark staircase can be 
incongruous and not at all funny (at least not for the person falling). The same is true for 
the person who takes a sip from a glass of clear liquid thinking it's gin, only to discover 
that it's gasoline (again, not funny for the accidental gas-drinker). There are many such 
cases of non-humorous incongruities, and their incontrovertible existence suggests that 
incongruity may well be a necessary condition for amusement, but it cannot possibly be 
sufficient. So, we must ask of incongruity theory, what conditions besides the presence of 
an incongruity must be met in order that we find a given situation, event, or object 
amusing?  
 A number of philosophers have followed James Beattie (1779) in addressing the 
existence of non-funny incongruities by arguing that the laughter reaction to an 
incongruity only occurs when there is no more powerful emotional or psychological 
reaction simultaneously present. In other words, if an incongruity triggers grief, anxiety, 
jealousy, anger, etc. in the subject, they will not find it funny because these more 
powerful emotions take precedent. This would explain why we don't find the sight of a 
truck hitting a pedestrian after running a red light funny. Alarm, stress, and concern 
would presumably override anything we might find humorous about the situation. 




non-humorous nervous or hysterical laughter). Psychological or emotional distance, 
however, is capable of muting these other reactions. An event that would be traumatic to 
witness in person can be rendered funny in a film or a cartoon; a character getting 
blindsided by a truck or bus is a mainstay of the slapstick genre. Of course there are 
degrees of separation that influence how amused we will be by a given situation. Take, 
for instance, the previous paragraph's examples of stumbling down the stairs or 
accidentally sipping gasoline with the pretense that it is gin. If these misfortunes befell us 
personally, we would likely not be amused (at least not right away), unless we were 
unharmed and in a relatively light-hearted mood. But even if we emerge unscathed, 
falling down the stairs after a long, stressful day at work is unlikely to amuse anyone. 
Mood, too, then, is an important variable in the amusement equation. A film poking fun 
at an unlucky-in-love middle-aged man would likely not amuse a viewer watching the 
film the day after his wife leaves him, regardless of how funny he might have found it the 
week before.  
 In addition to mood and psychological or emotional distance, there is the factor of 
temporal distance. As Mark Twain is said to have remarked, "comedy is tragedy plus 
time". Experiences that are humiliating in the moment can also eventually become funny 
memories once embarrassment is no longer our primary emotional reaction (we are often 
embarrassed by accidentally behaving in ways that violate the normal order of things). 
The same can be said about the tragic. There are endless, if for the most part somewhat 
offensive, jokes made about events like the Holocaust, American slavery, natural 
disasters, and so forth. Jokes about celebrity deaths and other violent news items also 




criticism by the listener or as a question by the teller, tacitly suggesting that there is some 
appropriate amount of time that ought to elapse before jokes about a tragedy can be 
funny.  
 Comedian Louis C.K. (2008), known for his crude, self-deprecating brand of 
humor, has played on this convention, joking that, "you can figure out how bad a person 
you are by how soon after 9/11 you masturbated—like, by how long you waited. For me 
it was between the two buildings going down". This joke, while still quite controversial, 
would have been wildly offensive (to many) if it had been delivered on the heels of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. The psychological distance afforded by time mitigates the 
offensiveness of jokes like this one, allowing us to find the incongruity presented 
amusing rather than enraging, depressing or otherwise upsetting. Of course, some of us 
may have found it funny immediately after the incident and some of us might never think 
that this joke is funny. 
 Somewhat similarly, the comedian Tig Notaro (2013) received a great deal of 
attention after delivering an extremely personal stand-up comedy performance in which 
she makes jokes about her recent (three days prior) diagnosis with breast cancer. Much of 
the humor in this routine is derived by making fun of the audience for laughing at the 
jokes while simultaneously making fun of them for being uncomfortable with the jokes. 
Early in the bit she recounts an anecdote in which upon finding out about Notaro's illness, 
a friend asks her if she's seen 'those funny cancer greeting cards'.  
"And so my friend texted me one of the cards. The outside of the card says: So 
you have cancer. Sad face. Then you open the card. And it says, 'thank goodness. 
I’ve been looking for a reason to shave my head.'" 
 






"I can’t believe that’s what you guys haven’t laughed at tonight. That was straight 
from the funny cancer greeting cards." (Live) 
 
Terminal illnesses like cancer, that wreak havoc on the lives of many people, are 
ordinarily considered taboo topics for joking. By joking about her disease, Notaro creates 
an incongruity between the conceptual norm and an specific experience for the audience. 
When they are uncomfortable laughing at that incongruity she pushes it a step farther, 
highlighting the incongruity inherent in "funny cancer greeting cards" as well as the 
incongruities between what the audience is willing to laugh at. After all, if they can laugh 






Chapter 3 — Origins of Incongruity Theory 
Kant and Schopenhauer 
  
 The initial development of incongruity theory is most often attributed to the work 
of Immanuel Kant who briefly addresses the issue of humor and, more precisely, 
laughter, in his seminal Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). Though the term 
"incongruity" itself is conspicuously absent from these pages (the phrase "incongruity 
theory" has been retroactively applied to a group of early philosophical accounts of 
humor in recent years), Kant's work on laughter and amusement is clearly in the business 
of describing the kind of dynamic at play in incongruity-based humor. In spite of the 
frustratingly small amount of space devoted to his theories of humor, the handful of 
passages Kant dedicates to examining the cause of laughter seem to suggest that he 
understood the amusement-reaction to comedy as an intellectual, cognitive process. This 
interpretation of Kant, if it is in fact accurate, is consistent with our contemporary 
conceptual pattern-based account of humor and its framing of amusement as a cognitive 
process rather than an emotional one (Morreall, "Taking Laughter Seriously", 15). 
Though Kant never actually writes the word "incongruity" when addressing humor, he 
posits laughter (which he seems to conflate with the perception of humor) as a reaction to 
a situation or utterance that is unexpected, absurd, illogical, or otherwise inappropriate in 
some way. Though these terms are not sufficiently specific to constitute the basis of a 
cogent theory of humor, interpreting this language as a recognition of—and attempted 





 Kant seems to identify three main components of the humorous. I will articulate 
them and then attempt to explain how they fit together as a theory of humor. First of all, 
Kant argues that, "In everything that is to excite a lively convulsive laugh there must be 
something absurd (in which the understanding, therefore, can find no satisfaction)" (CPJ, 
§53 5:333). Absurdity, then, Kant seems to be saying, is a necessary condition for 
amusement. We cannot be amused by anything that is not, at least somewhat, absurd.  
In order for the amusement reaction to take place, Kant argues, a subject must have a 
sensory perception that cannot be properly processed by his intellectual faculties. In other 
words, amusement is the result of an experience that is so absurd or nonsensical that we 
are incapable of understanding it.  
 Equally important in Kant's account of humor is the relationship between 
amusement and disappointed or frustrated expectations. Kant makes his own view on this 
matter quite clear, writing that, "Laughter is an affectation arising from the sudden 
transformation of a strained expectation into nothing" (CPJ, §53 5:333). There is some 
ambiguity as to what precisely Kant means by the "transformation of a strained 
expectation into nothing", but it seems reasonable to interpret this clause as a reference to 
expectations that are shown to have been misguided or unfounded. In any situation we 
generate expectations for certain outcomes based on our previous experiences of similar 
situations. When those expectations are shown to be inaccurate, we laugh, says Kant.  
 Finally, though it bears some relation to Kant's emphasis on the importance of 
frustrated expectations for the perception of humor, Kant argues that a third important 
part of the amusement process is momentary deception. That is, we must be fooled at 




contain something that can deceive for a moment" (CPJ, §53 5:334). In some senses, this 
assertion seems to be an extension of Kant's criteria of frustrated expectations; we are 
deceived into expecting outcomes that are not delivered. However, this does not 
necessarily exclude other kinds of deception from amusing us, so it seems valuable to 
leave the option open.  
 In sum, Kant posits three necessary conditions for amusement: in anything we 
find funny there must be some element of absurdity; anything we find funny must 
frustrate our expectations; and anything we find funny must momentarily deceive us. In 
order to more fully understand and critique Kant's view, I will attempt to apply it to 
several jokes as an explanation for why they are funny. In doing so I hope to show the 
strengths and weaknesses of Kant's account as it applies to actual instances of 
amusement. Perhaps it is best to begin with a (not so funny) joke that Kant himself 
provides as an example for his account.  
The heir of a rich relative wished to arrange for an imposing funeral but he 
lamented that he could not properly succeed; "for" (said he) "the more money I 
give my mourners to look sad, the more cheerful they look!"  (CPJ, §53 5:333) 
 
How does Kant's account explain what is funny about this joke? Let's begin with the 
criteria of absurdity. It is hard to know exactly what Kant means when he refers to 
absurdity in the context of humor. In fact, there is some discrepancy amongst translators 
as to how the term should be rendered in English, some translations read "absurd" while 
others read "nonsensical". Either way, Kant seems to think that the absurdity or nonsense 
at play in this joke has to do with the 'paradox' surrounding the affect of the mourners. 
Namely, the more money they are given to do their job well (that is, to look sad), the less 




this dynamic qualify as absurd? Perhaps to a certain extent, but not in the most robust 
sense of the word. 
 Kant however, places a great deal of emphasis on the dynamics of the audience's 
expectation for the joke. He writes—literally repeating himself—that the reason we laugh 
upon hearing this joke is that, "an expectation is suddenly transformed into nothing" 
(CPJ, §53 5:333.). The expectation engendered by the beginning of the joke—namely 
that we are about to hear a sad story about a failed funeral—is reduced to nothing when 
we realize that the rich relative is upset about something trivial. This transformation, 
Kant says, is what causes our amusement. Momentary deception, in the case of this joke, 
only seems to apply to the audience's expectations. That is, we are momentarily deceived 
when we think we are about to hear a sad story about a failed funeral because what we 
are about to hear is, in fact, a funny story about a failed funeral.  
 In Kant's lectures reproduced in Anthropology from A Pragmatic Point of View 
(1798), he restates his account of laughter in such a way that he combines the absurdity 
condition and the frustrated expectations condition. Kant writes, "If a mistaken judgment 
involves a great absurdity, this can produce exactly the same effect [laughter]" 
("Anthropology", §79 7:262). With this in mind, it is easier to understand Kant's account 
of absurdity as a necessary condition for humor in terms of the audience's expectations 
rather than as absurdity in general. It seems unlikely that he thinks we only laugh at 
absurd things because this would be an obviously false claim (there are innumerable 
situations in which we laugh at things that are not absurd or fail to laugh at things that are 
absurd). His emphatic inclusion of frustrated expectations as an important part of 




misinformed expectations, a relationship that is foundational to incongruity theory. If we 
find an experience absurd, Kant may be arguing, we do so because it fails to conform to 
the expectations we have about the way the world works. We laugh when we generate 
expectations for a certain outcome of a given situation and then are presented with an 
outcome that is absurd in light of those expectations. We don't perceive our expectations 
as absurd, rather, we perceive experiences that fail to meet our rationally generated 
expectations as absurd. When we try and fail to conform the absurd experience to our 
expectations we realize that our expectations were, in fact, misguided, and we laugh. 
 Let's try applying Kant's theory to some more contemporary jokes. For clarity's 
sake, let's summarize Kant's position thus far: amusement results from an experience that 
deceives us momentarily, and, which gives rise to expectations that do not adequately 
apply to the experience. Here is a joke that, according to a 2002 study by Richard 
Wiseman of LaughLab, is one of the funniest jokes in the world (although that does not 
necessarily mean that it is). 
Two hunters are out in the woods when one of them collapses. He doesn't 
seem to be breathing and his eyes are glazed. The other guy whips out his 
phone and calls the emergency services. He gasps, "My friend is dead! 
What can I do?". The operator says "Calm down. I can help. First, let's 
make sure he's dead." There is a silence, then a shot is heard. Back on the 
phone, the guy says "OK, now what?" 
 
 According to Kant's formulation of incongruity theory, this joke might be funny 
for a number of reasons. First of all, the punch-line contains a behavior that is absurd (or 
nonsensical) in light of audience expectations engendered not only by the set up but also 
by their experiences in the world. In any situation where a normal person is trying to 




for a heartbeat or for breathing. In this respect, the hunter's actions are absurd—he called 
911 trying to save his friend's life, why would he then proceed to shoot him (an action 
that is in direct contradiction with his goal of saving his friend)? There is, however, in 
this joke, something that clearly does "deceive for a moment". Namely, the ambiguous 
wording of the EMS operator's command. Though her words would ordinarily be 
sufficiently clear, we are deceived by the way the joke conceals the hunter's 
misinterpretation. After the punch-line is delivered, the audience realizes that they failed 
to understand the possibility that the operator's words could be misconstrued and that 
they failed to realize that the hunter had in fact misconstrued the operator's words. This, 
in addition to the manipulation of audience expectations and the absurdity of the hunter's 
actions, make the joke amusing on Kant's account. 
 
Preliminary Objections to Kant 
 Though Kant's account is relatively sophisticated, it suffers from some major 
flaws. The most basic of which, perhaps, is the emphasis he places on frustrated 
expectations rather than, as it is put in Chapter 2, violations of conceptual patterns or of 
the normal order of things. It is problematic to reduce incongruity theory to the 
frustration of expectations because doing so removes any possibility for explaining why 
we can be amused by the same thing more than once or when we know that we're hearing 
a joke. As discussed in Chapter 2, surprise cannot be a necessary condition for 
amusement because if it were, expecting to be amused (as in many cases of joke-telling 
or film-going, for instance) would preclude the possibility for actual amusement. This is 




spontaneous that makes us laugh, but rather its incongruous relationship with the more or 
less static pattern it interrupts" (116). 
 Additionally, Kant's vague language opens his account up to criticism. For 
instance, his insistence that audience expectations specifically "be reduced to nothing". 
Rather than simply saying that their expectations need to be frustrated to perceive humor, 
he emphasizes the "nothing" aspect. He writes, "it [the expectation] must not be 
transformed into the positive opposite of an expected object—for that is always 
something, and can be distressing—but into nothing" (CPJ, §53 5:333). This 
consideration is somewhat baffling, but Kant seems to be attempting to create a 
distinction between what constitutes a funny joke (a statement that often contains false 
information) and a flat-out lie. When we are told something that immediately recognize 
as untrue, we are not amused.  
 Similarly, Kant's emphasis on the necessity of absurdity for the perception of 
humor to take place is untenable. For instance, in the joke above, if instead of shooting 
his friend to make sure he was dead the hunter stripped and climbed a tree nude, we 
wouldn't find the joke amusing. If this modification were actually made, the joke would 
still be absurd and the expectations of the audience would still be frustrated but it 
wouldn't be nearly as funny. It seems that Kant's account is missing a third consideration 
for what makes jokes funny because it is entirely possible for a situation to be absurd and 
to frustrate a subject's expectations without amusing them. I suspect Kant may have been 
getting at this third consideration with his discussion of the deceptive quality of humor, 




conditions for the perception of amusement, Kant's account suffers from a combination of 
excessive complication and lack of specificity.  
 It difficult to say with certainty if Kant's account suggests that these three 
necessary conditions combine to produce a sufficient condition for the perception of 
humor. It seems likely, however, that this is his intention. Nonetheless, there are 
numerous counterexamples to this interpretation of his account. In a slight modification 
of the cold fire case, imagine reaching out towards a fire and feeling cold, only to realize 
that it wasn't in fact a fire but a block of ice very convincingly disguised as fire. In this 
case your expectations are frustrated, an element of absurdity is present, and you are have 
momentarily deceived by the convincing disguise. Furthermore, in this case you wouldn't 
be met with the positive opposite of your expectations and as far as I can see your 
expectations would be "reduced to nothing". Nonetheless, you would most likely not be 
amused. The necessary conditions provided by Kant are too broad and do not 
appropriately combine into a sufficient condition for the perception of humor. By placing 
too much emphasis on the condition of frustrated expectations and absurdity, Kant allows 
for too many non-humorous incongruities to meet his criteria for the humorous. By 
orienting his view along the lines of concept-object incongruity, Schopenhauer is able to 
somewhat improve on Kant's account of incongruity theory.   
 
Schopenhauer    
 Schopenhauer improves Kant's account by focusing less on absurdity and 
frustrated expectations, instead suggesting that amusement is caused by incongruities 




Schopenhauer's position on humor and, as he calls it, 'the ludicrous', stands on his 
assertion of a gap between rational abstractions about the world and individual 
perceptions of it. In Volume I of The World as Will and Idea, Schopenhauer argues that 
abstract rational knowledge is founded on our perceptions of the world around us but that 
it is impossible for our abstract, conceptual representations to ever fully "apply to the fine 
distinctions of difference and innumerable modifications of the actual"  (§13). In other 
words, considering the infinite shades of nuance given to objects in the perceived world, 
our abstract ideas or concepts, which are drawn from the synthesis and extension of 
individual perceptions, can never describe the material world with complete accuracy. To 
illustrate this aspect of his metaphysics, imagine the abstract concept of a chair. After 
many years of looking at, sitting in (and maybe even falling out of) chairs, we develop an 
abstract concept for the kind of objects that can be described as chairs. This concept 
might be something like "a sturdy structure for sitting in, usually with four legs, 
sometimes with wheels or rockers". Though this abstract concept accurately describes a 
lot of chairs, it is impossible for the concept to describe every chair you will ever 
perceive with complete accuracy. Schopenhauer likens the difference between the world 
given to us through perception and our abstract, conceptual ideas about the world to the 
difference between a painting and a tile mosaic; the mosaic closely approximates the 
shapes and colors of the painting but will never be able to achieve the same level of 
descriptive detail (WWI I, §13). 
 In the passages he devotes to his discussion of the ludicrous and the cause of 
laughter, Schopenhauer asserts that laughter is caused by the recognition of a particularly 




subject's conceptual representation of it. "The cause of laughter in every case is simply 
the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which 
have been thought through it in some relation, and laughter itself is just the expression of 
this incongruity" (WWI I, §13). Schopenhauer identifies two ways in which we come to 
recognize such an incongruity. In the first case, we subsume two different objects under 
the same concept. When it becomes clear that the two objects are different in many 
respects and can only be subsumed under the same category from a "one-sided point of 
view", we recognize the incongruity between our conceptual representation of the 
object(s) and the objects themselves (WWI I, §13). Humorous puns, for instance, would 
be an example of this process. Equally common, according to Schopenhauer, are 
occasions on which we notice an incongruity between a single real object and a concept 
under which, in some respects, it is correctly subsumed but in other respects it is 
incorrectly subsumed. About this process, Schopenhauer writes, "the more correct the 
subsumption of such objects under a concept may be from one point of view, and the 
greater and more glaring their incongruity with it, from another point of view, the greater 
is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. All laughter then is occasioned 
by a paradox...whether expressed in words or actions" (WWI I, §13). 
  Though no examples of this theory are provided in Volume I, Schopenhauer 
provides an example of this kind of humorous incongruity in Volume II of The World as 
Will and Representation (1844). He suggests the image of a physician's headstone 
inscribed with an epithet usually reserved for heroic fallen soldiers: Here like a hero he 
lies, and those he has slain lie around him (93). In this case, Schopenhauer writes, the 




conceptual representation of "hero". Equally correctly subsumed under the concept of 
"hero" is a fallen soldier who claimed the lives of many enemies. The specific hero-
making properties of the doctor and soldier are completely different, however, so 
different in fact, that they are opposites. Though the perception of the doctor matches the 
conceptual representation of "hero" as, say, "a great man", it does not match the 
conceptual representation of a hero as "a man who has killed many people" (WWR II, 93). 
The concept of "hero" applies correctly to the particular perception of the doctor from 
some angles but not from others; the concept is too general to capture all the various 
instantiations of heroes that are available in the real world. Because, on Schopenhauer's 
account, the concept "hero" is extremely appropriate to perception of "a doctor" on the 
hand but extremely incongruous on the other, this incongruity is capable of amusing us 
(Lewis, 43).  
 We can observe comedy functioning in a similar way when we consider this 
contemporary joke set in a doctor's office: 
A man goes in to see the doctor for a physical. The doctor comes into the 
room and says,  
 "I've got some bad news, you're going to have to stop eating that 
red meat."  
 "Oh no", the patient moans, "How come?"  
The doctor replies,  
 "So I can examine you!" 
 
If we analyze this joke's funniness according to Kant's account, we would be forced into 
saying something about the absurdity of the situation. While there is something absurd 
about a man eating a steak in a hospital gown on an examination table, there is nothing 
really absurd about the doctor's reaction; in most cases, it seems, if a patient were to eat a 




Schopenhauer's account, however, avoids this pitfall by acknowledging that there is a set 
of expectations and an assumed etiquette that conceptually govern doctor-patient 
interactions; these expectations and norms are features of the conceptual representations 
of 'a doctor' and 'a visit to the doctor's office' that may not be present in every instance of 
doctors and doctor's office visits in the real world. When the doctor tells the patient that 
he shouldn't eat so much red meat, the audience makes a number of assumptions about 
what the doctor means based on their conceptual, abstract understanding of a doctor as a 
person who gives useful health advice to patients. We also assume—in accordance with 
doctor's office etiquette—that most patients would never consider eating a T-bone while 
sitting on an examination table. With these assumptions in place, the joke's set up leads 
us to be amused by the incongruity between our conceptual representation of doctor-
patient interaction and the individual perception of the doctor-patient interaction in the 
joke. Namely, that the doctor is not giving the patient a direct command to stop eating red 
meat at that moment, but that he is suggesting that his patient eat less red meat in general. 
The instruction to "stop eating so much red meat" in the context of a doctor's office is 
ordinarily correctly subsumed under the concept of "health advice" but in this particular 
case that concept is inaccurate; the instruction isn't health advice but an expression of a 
logistical concern. When the incongruity between concept and perception is recognized, 
we react with laughter. 
  It may be worth noting that a joke like this seems to intentionally promote the 
latter assumption. Though "you're going to have to stop eating that red meat" is 
technically something the doctor might say to refer to a particular instance of his patient 




doctor would probably use more specific language, i.e. "please stop eating that steak, this 
room was just sterilized 5 minutes ago!". The use of general term "red meat" leads the 
audience to categorize the intent of the statement, conceptually, as general advice rather 
than as a specific, practical instruction.  
 Peter Lewis (2005) uses an apt example from the opening of Woody Allen's opus 
Annie Hall (1977) to illustrate Schopenhauer's account. In the film, Allen recites 'an old 
joke': Two women are at a Catskill mountain resort and one turns to the other and says, 
"Gee, the food at this place is really terrible." to which her friend responds, "I know and 
such small portions". Parsing this joke with Schopenhauer's account of humor, Lewis 
writes that, "ordinarily, when assessing hotel food, 'small portions' is an acceptable 
complaint; but in this case, while 'small portions' is a correct description, it is a 
paradoxical complaint in light of the fact that the food is especially poor" (41). Lewis' 
analysis here is quite helpful in illustrating an important point about Schopenhauer's 
articulation of incongruity theory. Namely, his argument that we laugh when an object or 
event can be subsumed properly under an abstract concept in most respects but in one 
particularly relevant respect is incongruous (WWI I, §13). In this case, "small portions" as 
an instantiation of the conceptual category of "food complaints" is incongruous because 
of one particular aspect of the particular food in question, namely that it is terrible. In 
most cases, a complaint about small portions would be congruous with the concept of 






Chapter 4 — Objections and Critique 
 Both Kant and Schopenhauer provide interesting and somewhat successful 
accounts of incongruity theory, but they both suffer from ambiguity about whether or not 
they are providing necessary or sufficient conditions for amusement. It seems that in both 
cases the intent is to provide sufficient conditions but the conditions provided are only 
serviceable as necessary conditions. Both Kant and Schopenhauer frame their accounts as 
explanations for all instances of laughter (though I suspect their work is intended to be 
limited to the scope of humorous laughter), but counter-examples are readily available 
against both accounts. Namely, the existence of incongruities that are not amusing 
regardless of how the incongruity is framed.  
 A serious problem with incongruity theory is that it seeks to explain both why a 
given subject finds certain situations amusing and why certain situations have the 
potential to amuse certain subjects. Incongruity theory as an account of the features a 
situation must have if it is to potentially be perceived as funny by a given subject can get 
away with providing only necessary conditions. Even if the necessary conditions for 
potential funniness are met by some situation (i.e. if the situation is perceived as 
incongruous by the subject), it is still possible for the subject not to be amused by it. In 
this respect, those who defend incongruity theory could assert that any incongruous 
situation has the potential to be funny (even reaching out toward fire and feeling cold), 
but that a subject's not perceiving it as funny is due to some aspect of their psychology, 
their mood, their conceptual frame of reference, etc. This alone, however, is not 




things funny. It seems that there are plenty of situations that present an incongruity by 
violating our normal conceptual patterns at times when we are easily disposed to 
amusement, that don't amuse us. I've already mentioned Mike Martin's point about surreal 
art, and my own example of incongruities at a magic show. In the previous chapter on 
Kant I discussed how the joke about the hunter can be modified to remain incongruous 
but lose its humorousness nevertheless; it has been well established that a situation can 
meet the necessary conditions for the perception of humor laid out by incongruity theory 
but nevertheless fail to amuse us.  
 It seems that Kant and Schopenhauer, as well as the contemporary accounts of 
incongruity theory on which my own is based, are vulnerable to this criticism. 
Essentially, they are too broad and fail to provide sufficient conditions for amusement. 
Incongruity theory asserts that a subject will be amused if and only if (a) they perceive an 
incongruity between an actual experience and a conceptual pattern while being (b) in the 
right kind of mood and (c) bearing the right kind of emotional and temporal relationship 
to the incongruity in question. These conditions are too complex and contingent to form a 
satisfying account. 
 It is my contention that incongruity theory needs to provide an explanation for 
why we don't always find instances of random absurdity amusing. It seems possible that 
providing a completely watertight sufficient condition for amusement or the perception of 
humor may be beyond reach. And though I doubt it will solve the sufficient condition 
problem entirely, I believe that an inquiry into the relationship between humorous 
incongruities and their relationship to rationality, or the congruous, will provide some 




incongruities in general. It is my contention that we are most amused by incongruities 
that present themselves in such a way that their incongruity is not immediately apparent 
and that amusement results from recognizing the incongruity at the core of an event or 
object that doesn't immediately appear incongruous. I also believe that by engaging in 
this inquiry we can show that there is something fundamentally humorous about the 






Chapter 5 — Humor and Fundamental Incongruities  
 
 In the final chapter I turn my attention to the relationship between comedy and 
reason. The goal of this investigation is two-fold. First, I hope to identify and provide 
evidence for the existence of an important relationship between reason and humorous 
incongruity that helps incongruity theory respond to the objection raised in the previous 
chapter. To accomplish this I will show that we are most amused by the presence of 
incongruities that do not immediately seem incongruous. Secondly, I will show how 
humor's close relationship with reason is responsible for humor thriving in the spaces 
where reason fails to satisfy our curiosity. I will identify two closely related fundamental 
incongruities inherent in the human condition. The first is between the abstract rationality 
that frames conceptual thought and the irrationality of human behavior and the world. 
The second fundamental incongruity is between the seriousness with which we take our 
lives, beliefs, thoughts, reasons, etc. and our ability to acknowledge the possibility that 
everything about our lives is arbitrary or meaningless and thus not worth taking seriously. 
Some form of these two fundamental incongruities, I believe, can be found in almost all 
instances of amusement. 
 That there is a close relationship between humor (or, as it is often put, laughter) 
and reason has been asserted for quite some time, although historically the discussion of 
this relationship often paints humor in an exceedingly negative light. In The Republic, 
Plato repeatedly argues against the virtue of laughter and comedy on the grounds that 
laughing not only renders people irresponsible and weak, but that all humor frustrates 




portrays eminent humans as being overcome by laughter" ought to be refused and gives a 
doubly emphatic condemnation of depictions of the gods laughing (Republic III, 388e). 
Similar statements about the frustration of reason inherent in amusement can be found in 
the work of many thinkers throughout history. Morreall (1983) has collected a number of 
salient examples. For instance Lord Chesterfield's insistence that, "there is nothing so 
illiberal, and ill-bred, as audible laughter. True wit, or sense, never yet made anybody 
laugh...I am as willing and apt to be pleased as anybody; but I am sure that since I had 
full use of my reason nobody has ever heard me laugh" (Morreall, 88). Equally vehement 
is Ludovici's assertion that, "humour is the lazier principle to adopt in approaching all 
questions [compared to reason], and that is why the muddle is increasing everywhere" 
(88). Along the same lines, George Vasey wonders if, "children would ever begin to 
laugh...if they were treated naturally and rationally" (88). Though most contemporary 
writers in the philosophy of humor take a more favorable approach to the matter of 
humor itself, incongruity theory—however formulated—necessarily allows for 
amusement to result from the frustration of reason (but not, as Kant argues, that 
amusement will necessarily result from the frustration of reason). On Kant's account 
events or objects that pervert or distort reason will strike us as absurd, unexpected, or 
deceptive. For Schopenhauer especially, humor necessarily frustrates reason because his 
metaphysics asserts that our conceptual representations (which are shown to be 
inadequate by the humorous) are derived rationally. Finally, it is clear how reason itself 
and our faith in the power of reason underlie and account for many of our conceptual 
patterns. We understand the world as ordered, as governed by rational chains of causes 




rationally derived conceptual models of experience; we perceive objects or events as 
incongruous when they fail to conform to this rational conceptual model of the world. 
Incongruity theory, therefore, is obligated to assert the contradiction or failure of reason 
as (at least) a possible source of amusement. Nonetheless, our continued adherence to 
rational thought and our faith in the firm structure of reason as a governing framework 
for the universe is crucial to the comedic process; if the universe were absolutely chaotic, 
there would be no incongruity (in virtue of the fact that there would be no expectation of 
congruity), and therefore, according to incongruity theory, no humor. Kenneth Lash 
(1948) addresses this aspect of incongruity theory, writing that, "in a universe completely 
dominated by chance...any fixity or semi-fixity of expectation would be nonexistent; 
therefore because we have found humor to result from the incongruity between 
preconceived ideas and actuality, the comic would, of necessity, disappear" (116).  
Because humor frustrates reason is no cause to think that it dismantles its tenets, 
however. Rather, humor seems at once to subvert and uphold reason, it fills in where 
reason is stymied and reminds us that although reason is often reliable, there are aspects 
of life that don't fit the rational model.  
  The end goal of this chapter is to investigate the way humor operates in the 
epistemological void left by rational inquiry into metaphysical problems beyond the 
realm of experience. In order to do so, however, it is prudent to first demonstrate the 
existence of an important relationship between reason or humor in mundane or simple 
jokes. Manipulations and perversions of logic are a consistent part of jokes and a great 
many joke formulas and jokes themselves are essentially dressed-up examples of logical 




and comedy has long been noted, perhaps most significantly by Schopenhauer who uses 
the term 'paradox' as a foundational component of his theory of the ludicrous. Marie 
Swabey (1961) also finds evidence of the paradoxical aspect of humor in Plato's Philebus 
where he likens laughter to relieving an itch by scratching it in that both experiences 
result in both pleasure and pain (161). It seems natural, then, that one type of logical 
incongruity frequently employed for humorous effect is the paradox. Here is an 
exceedingly simple example from Cathcart and Klein's (2007) book of philosophical 
jokes: 
Salesman: "This vacuum cleaner will cut your work in half!" 
Customer: "Terrific, give me two of 'em!" 
        (94) 
 
It shouldn't be much of a stretch to understand how this old routine plays on a logical 
paradox (seemingly sound reasoning, based on seemingly true premises that leads to a 
false conclusion) for humorous effect. Cathcart and Klein explain this joke in terms of 
Zeno's Paradox, but it also plays on the failure of pure reason to adequately account for 
the peculiarities of language and of human life in general. Though at first blush it may be 
hard (at least for the non-philosopher) to see what exactly is wrong with the reasoning in 
this joke, almost everyone who hears it will understand that there is something off about 
the logic. If the customer has x amount of vacuuming to do and he buys a vacuum that 
will cut his work in half he will have 1/2x work to do. If he buys the second vacuum he'll 
have 1/2(1/2x) work to do, or 1/4x work to do. And so on for each additional vacuum he 
buys. Instead, the customer incorrectly understands the phrase "cut your work in half" to 
mean that the vacuum will do 1/2x work as a concrete, non-relative amount of work. If he 




cut his work by 100%, a conclusion that is obviously false but is arrived at in a seemingly 
sound way. A similar process is at play in simple linguistic tricks like Yogi Berra's 
famous quip, "Always go to other people's funerals, otherwise they won't come to yours". 
The reason provided in support of his suggestion to "always attend other people's 
funerals" seems, at first glance, to be a valid reason; after all, if you don't attend 
someone's funeral they certainly won't be at yours. It's just that the reason they won't be 
at your funeral isn't that you failed to attend theirs, but due to the fact that they'll 
necessarily (given the nature of funerals) be dead.  
 We are often amused by statements that appear to be necessarily false but also 
appear necessarily true at the same time. Morreall gives this example:  
An art dealer bought a canvas signed 'Picasso' and travelled to Cannes to see if it 
was genuine. Picasso took one look and said, "It's a fake". 
  A few months later, the man bought another canvass signed 'Picasso' and 
returned to Cannes. Again Picasso said, "It's a fake".  
 "Cher Maître", the man protested, "It so happens that I saw you with my 
own eyes working on this very painting several years ago".  
 Picasso simply shrugged his shoulders and replied, "I often paint fakes". 
(76) 
 
 This anecdote is amusing because it presents the listener with a situation that 
seems possible and impossible at once; the painting in question is an authentic, fake 
Picasso, a situation that seems unworkable. In fact, the only possible way a painting 
could qualify as fake and as an authentic Picasso is if Picasso himself painted a 'fake' 
(which, of course, seems impossible for Picasso to do). This story is humorously 
incongruous in its violation of our understanding of what constitutes authentic authorship 
and what constitutes a fake piece of artwork. We ordinarily believe that a painting p 
created by artist q is authentic if and only if q in fact painted p. However we also give 




that the painting is a fake, an assertion that contradicts the results of the formula for 
authenticity above. If Picasso says that p is a 'fake Picasso' but that he in fact painted p, 
then p is both authentic and fake at the same time. In fact, Picasso is the only person on 
the planet who would seem incapable of painting a fake Picasso.  
 Here is another example of a joke based on flawed logic. In this case the story 
manipulates the process of deductive logic, its potential to amuse is derived from a 
flawed premise in the argument. 
An old cowboy goes into a bar and orders a drink. As he sits there sipping 
his whiskey, a young lady sits down next to him. She turns to the cowboy 
and asks him, “Are you a real cowboy?”  
 He replies, “Well, I’ve spent my whole life on the ranch, herding 
horses, mending fences, and branding cattle, so, yeah, I reckon I am a real 
cowboy.”  
 The woman responds, “I’m a lesbian. I spend my whole day 
thinking about women. As soon as I get up in the morning , I think about 
women. When I shower or watch TV, everything seems to make me think 
of women.”  
 A little while later, a couple sits down next to the old cowboy and 
asks him, "Are you a real cowboy?”  
 He replies, "Well, I always thought I was, but earlier today I found 
out that I’m a lesbian!” (Cathcart, Klein, 34) 
 
 This joke is funny because the cowboy employs a false premise in his evaluation 
of his identity. Using the argument, 
 P1) If a person spends all their time doing X and thinking about X, then they are  
        a real X-er 
 P2) I spend all my time doing X 
      ∴ I am a real X-er  
 
 The cowboy arrives at the conclusion that he is a real cowboy. When the woman 
uses the same reasoning to show she is a lesbian, substituting "if a woman" for "if a 
person" in P1, the cowboy, failing to understand that P1 is no longer is true for him, 




is the cowboy's slavish adherence to deductive logic coupled with his failure to revisit his 
argument after arriving at an obviously faulty conclusion. Such devotion to the results of 
deductive reasoning is incongruous with the ordinary way in which we construct 
identities for ourselves. Furthermore, the cowboy's willingness to re-identify himself on a 
dime is incongruous with our conceptual understanding of how personal identities work; 
that is, that they are not ordinarily changed so lightly.  
  Another logical fallacy that is often invoked by jokesters is the post hoc ergo 
propter hoc fallacy. This fallacy is to conclude that because one event follows another the 
second event is caused by the first (Dowden, IEP). An outrageously exaggerated instance 
of this fallacy would be to believe that because every morning the train passes your house 
right after you wake up, that your waking up is what causes the train to pass by. In many 
cases, instances of this fallacy are easy to spot, but sometimes, especially when they are 
cleverly hidden, instances of this fallacy can slip past us unnoticed. Here is an example of 
a joke that manipulates the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy very nicely.  
 An older Jewish gentleman marries a younger lady, and they are very 
much in love. However, no matter what the husband does sexually, the woman 
never reaches orgasm. Since a Jewish wife is entitled to sexual pleasure, they 
decide to ask the rabbi. The rabbi listens to their story, strokes his beard, and 
makes the following suggestion:  
 “Hire a strapping young man. While the two of you are making love, have 
the young man wave a towel over you. That will help the wife fantasize and 
should bring on an orgasm.”  
 They go home and follow the rabbi’s advice. They hire a handsome young 
man and he waves a towel over them as they make love. It doesn’t help, and she is 
still unsatisfied. Perplexed, they go back to the rabbi. 
 “Okay,” says the rabbi to the husband, “let’s try it reversed. Have the 
young man make love to your wife and you wave the towel over them.” 
  Once again, they follow the rabbi’s advice. The young man gets into bed 
with the wife, and the husband waves the towel. The young man gets to work with 
great enthusiasm and the wife soon has an enormous, room-shaking, screaming 





 "You schmuck, that’s the way you wave a towel!”  (Cathcart, Klein, 40) 
 
 There are a number of incongruities at play in all these jokes between conceptual 
patterns and individual experiences that contradict or don't properly apply to them. 
Inasmuch as conceptual patterns are rationally derived from the abstraction and synthesis 
of experiences, the fundamental incongruities are between the bare system of rationality 
we use to make sense of the world and experiences that seem like they should—but 
ultimately don't—fit neatly into that system. For a joke to be funny, it seems, it must not 
only present an incongruity, but must present an incongruity that at first blush doesn't 
entirely appear to be incongruous. It has been shown time and time again that the mere 
presence or perception of an incongruity can be funny, but is not sufficient for the 
perception of humor. It is fair to say that some oddball jokes are amusing simply in virtue 
of their absurdity ("How many surrealist painters does it take to screw in a lightbulb?" 
"Fish."), but the jokes we find the most amusing always seem to present an incongruity in 
such a way that the incongruity is not immediately apparent. In slightly different terms, 
we are especially amused by incongruities created by processes—behavioral or 
intellectual—that seem, in some sense, reasonable or rational. The joke about the hunters 
discussed in Chapter 3 is a wonderful example of such a joke. As I suggested, the joke 
would remain incongruous if the hunter, instead of shooting his friend, did something 
completely unexpected and absurd like hanging up the phone, sprouting wings, and flying 
to Canada. This punch-line, however, would not make for a particularly funny joke. It is 
funny precisely because the incongruous object in the joke is the product of fallacious 




 Here is another (very famous) example of a joke that exploits the potential failure 
of inductive reasoning (though misarticulated in the story as deductive reasoning!) to 
generate amusement.  
 Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson are on a camping trip in the English 
countryside. They pitch their tent under the stars, eat their dinner and go to sleep. 
Around 3 a.m. Holmes wakes Watson with a light nudge and asks:  
 "Watson, look up at the sky and tell me what you see."  
 Watson pauses for a moment, thinking, then answers: "I see millions and 
millions of stars." 
 Holmes says: "And what do you deduce from that?"  
 “Well,” Watson says, “Astronomically, it tells me that there are millions 
of galaxies and potentially billions of planets. Astrologically, I observe that 
Saturn is in Leo. Horologically, I deduce that the time is approximately a quarter 
past three. Meteorologically, I suspect that we will have a beautiful day 
tomorrow. Theologically, I see that God is all-powerful, and we are small and 
insignificant. Why do you ask, Holmes?" 
 "Watson, you idiot, it means that somebody stole our tent." 
 
 Watson's musings in this joke are rational inductions based on his observations 
and it could even be said that all his conclusions are in fact correct. But in spite of his 
observational prowess, Watson fails to notice one incredibly relevant feature of his 
environment, namely that the tent he went to sleep in is missing. His reasoning is sound, 
but fails to bring him to an appropriate conclusion. He doesn't pay attention to the fact 
that he is only able to make his inductions from the stars' positions because his tent is 
missing. There is an incongruity between Watson's reasoning, which is sound and leads 
to technically correct conclusions, and the fact that in this particular case his rational 
process leads him away from the practical information he needs to acquire. 
 Schopenhauer, it seems, is interested in and aware of the gap between abstract 
reason and perceptions of the actual. He writes that, "although abstract rational 
knowledge...is founded on [ideas of perception], it is by no means in such entire 




to them quite accurately" (WWI I, §13). This, in fact, is the foundation for his theory of 
laughter, which is situated as a part of his larger metaphysics. This persistent lack of 
congruity between abstract rational knowledge and actual experiences is really at the 
heart of any formulation of incongruity theory. When we perceive humor we are 
perceiving an incongruity between an actual experience and our conceptual model for 
that kind of experience. Some such incongruities seem to exist between experience and 
rationality indirectly, as incongruities between experiences and rationally derived 
conceptual patterns. Others, like the jokes above, seem to present incongruities between 
experience and reason itself.  
 Ted Cohen (1999) argues that a great deal of traditional Jewish humor is 
constructed by highlighting incongruities between rationality and actual experiences. 
Describing such jokes, Cohen writes, "They all display a crazy logic. They have an 
insane rationality, a logical rigor gone over the edge" (46).  Take this example:  
 A poor Jewish man stopped at the house of a rich Jewish man to 
ask for a handout.  
 “I don’t just give away money,” declared the rich man, “but I have 
a Gentile who mows my lawn and I pay him $20. You mow my lawn and 
I’ll pay you $25.”  
 “Let the Gentile keep the job,” says the poor Jew. “Just give me 
the $5.” (49) 
 
 As Cohen points out, there is something incredibly rational about the poor man's 
request in this joke in spite of the fact that his reasoning brings him to a conclusion that 
seems, in some respects, quite ludicrous. Though it seems like there must be a mistake in 
his reasoning, the flaw is somewhat difficult to identify. This may be because, in fact, 
there is no serious problem with the poor man's reasoning, it is merely that his rationally 




money that we receive. Additionally, the conventional thinking (at least in capitalist 
ideology) is that the poor man ought to eagerly accept $25 in exchange for work rather 
than $5 for nothing. The rich man says he never gives out charity, but he is willing to 
give the poor Jewish man $5 more than the Gentile for no reason other than their shared 
faith. It is, essentially, charity. When the poor Jew just asks for the five extra dollars he 
exposes something irrational about the rich Jew's attitudes and beliefs about charity and 
earning money. This joke highlights an incongruity between our faith in, and reliance on, 
logic and the fact that our behavior often fails to adhere strictly to rationality.  
 I am particularly fond of this humorous anecdote, reproduced by Cohen (1999), 
which parodies the kind of hardcore logic often employed by Talmudic scholars.  
A young man applies to study with a Talmudic scholar. The scholar rejects him, 
saying, “Before you can study Talmud, you must know Jewish logic.”  
 “But I already know logic,” protests the student, “Aristotelian syllogisms, 
truth-functional logic, predicate logic, set theory, everything.”  
 “That’s not Jewish logic,” replies the scholar, but the student persists, and 
so the scholar offers to give him a test to determine whether he is prepared.  
 “Here is the question,” says the scholar. “Two men go down a chimney. 
One has a dirty face, one has a clean face. Which one washes?” 
  “That’s easy,” says the student, “the one with the dirty face.” 
  “Wrong,” says the scholar. “The one with the clean face looks at the other 
one, sees a dirty face, and thinks his must also be dirty, and so the one with the 
clean face washes.” 
  “I see,” says the student. “It is a little more complicated than I thought, 
but I can do this. Please test me again.”  
 “All right,” sighs the scholar. “Here is the question. Two men go down a 
chimney. One has a dirty face, one has a clean face. Which one washes?”  
 In surprise the student answers, “Just as you said, the one with the clean 
face washes.”  
 “Wrong,” says the scholar. “The one with the dirty face observes his 
companion looking at him and making ready to wash his face. ‘Ah ha,’ he thinks. 
‘He must see a dirty face, and it’s mine.’ And so the one with the dirty face 
washes.”  
 “It is even more complicated than I yet realized,” says the student, “but 
now I do understand. Please test me once more.”  
 “Just once more,” says the scholar. “Here is the question. Two men go 




 “Now I know the answer,” says the student. “The one with the dirty face 
washes, just as I thought in the beginning, but for a different reason.”  
 “Wrong,” says the scholar. “If two men go down a chimney, how can only 
one have a dirty face? Go and study. When you know Jewish logic, come back.” 
(Cohen, 65) 
 
 This story is funny because it presents, once again, an incongruity between 
abstract reason and individual experiences that somehow refuse to be described 
appropriately by reason. This particular joke, however, contains an insightful truth within 
its humor, namely that no matter how soundly and logically one tries to reason their way 
through a problem, the universe can be irrational. Sometimes, as in this story, the 
appropriate response to the problem is to inquire about the premises. After all, if two men 
go down a chimney how could only one have a dirty face? In this sense this story is 
similar to the Sherlock joke above because both examples demonstrate the practical 
futility of reason if the peculiarities and irrationalities of the perceived world are 
unaccounted for. 
 My suggestion here is that Schopenhauer is right to assert a fundamental 
incongruity between reason in the abstract and the particular experiences that constitute 
day-to-day life. We use reason to extrapolate from our experiences to conceptual patterns 
and models of how the world works. These conceptual models are necessarily 
incongruent with some of our experiences because the world itself is not governed wholly 
by reason and no abstract concept can adequately describe the innumerable shades of 
nuance that characterize worldly experience. There is an incongruity fundamental to the 
human experience between the rational, conceptually ideal world, and the flawed, 
sometimes irrational reality of the world we inhabit and, perhaps more strikingly, the 




at the foundation of a great deal of humor. When we laugh at intellectual or moral 
ineptitude, when we laugh at miscommunications or linguistic ambiguity, when we laugh 
at absurdities, it is because we are amused by the failure of our actual experiences to live 
up to the rationally derived, conceptual ideals we have created; just as the comic cannot 
exist in a world defined by chaos, it is equally impossible in a perfectly rational world. As 
Baudelaire writes, "the Incarnate World was never known to laugh, for Him who knows 
all things, whose powers are infinite, the comic does not exist" (Morreall, "Taking 
Laughter Seriously", 126). 
 There is, I believe, a brand of comedy which, in addition to being quite popular, 
takes direct advantage of the incongruity between the human aspiration towards 
rationality and the persistent and inevitable human failure to achieve such a state. This 
kind of humor delights in pointing out the cosmic irrationality of the beliefs, goals, and 
traditions that we hold dear, and in some cases as sacred. Take, for instance, this Jerry 
Seinfeld routine, which exemplifies this type of comedy: 
We don’t understand death. And the proof of this is that we give dead people a 
pillow. I mean, I think if you can’t stretch out and get some solid rest at that point, 
I don’t see how bedding accessories really make the difference. They've got the 
guy in a suit with a pillow. Now, is he going to a meeting, or is he catching forty 
winks? I mean, let’s make up our mind where we think they’re going. (The Pony 
Remark) 
 
This piece of stand-up comedy perfectly articulates the incongruities between the 
absolute unjustifiability of so many widely-held and unquestioned beliefs and the fact 
that we hold them nonetheless. In a related routine, Seinfeld riffs on a survey finding that 
reports Americans' number one fear to be public speaking and Americans' number two 
fear to be death. Which means, as Seinfeld points out, "for most people, if you're ever at a 




again, the humor in this quip is derived from highlighting the irrationality of human 
behavior and implicitly contrasting it with the rational purity we hold up as an abstract 
ideal.  
 It is not a coincidence that these jokes are both about death, an event that unites us 
in its inevitability. In his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Kant shows that the answers to 
many persistent metaphysical problems like those about the nature of death are 
unattainable through the use of pure reason. It is impossible, on his account, for us to 
have justifiable knowledge of things beyond the realm of experience. In the wake of the 
Kantian critique, we are struck, and at times frustrated, by the impotence of rational 
inquiry into questions about the nature of death, the purpose of existence, the existence of 
god. Interestingly enough, however, these are topics about which a great many people 
hold very serious beliefs. This inability to satisfactorily confirm or disconfirm our beliefs 
or even our conjectures about the realm beyond our experience, perhaps, is the great 
uncertainty of the human condition. 
 Thomas Nagel (1971) address this fundamental incongruity of human existence in 
terms of what he calls 'philosophical absurdity', a close cousin of robust epistemological 
skepticism. Though he doesn't frame his argument in terms of comedy, there is a 
humorous aspect in his writing, highlighted perhaps by his use of the humor-term 'ironic' 
to characterize life's potential meaninglessness. Nagel's suggestion is that "most people 
feel on occasion that life is absurd, and some feel it vividly and continually" (716). He 
dismisses arguments in support of this intuition based both on the temporal or spatial 
insignificance of humanity in the cosmic scheme, and on the assertion that the 




broken, as inadequate. He argues instead that our sense of life's absurdity comes from, "a 
collision of the seriousness with which we take our lives and the perpetual possibility of 
regarding everything about which we are serious as arbitrary, or open to doubt...[Life] is 
absurd because we ignore the doubts that we know cannot be settled, continuing to live 
with nearly undiminished seriousness in spite of them" (719). This collision culminates, 
according to Nagel, not in failing to find some next link in the chain of justification 
supporting our actions (i.e. being unable to explain why we do anything), but in failing to 
find justification for the very system we use to evaluate, justify, and critique. "We step 
back to find that the whole system of justification and criticism, which controls our 
choices and supports our claims to rationality, rests on responses and habits that we never 
question, that we should not know how to defend without circularity, and to which we 
shall continue to adhere even after they are called into question" (720).  
 So beyond the fundamental incongruity outlined above (between the rational ideal 
and the flawed real), lies a deeper internal incongruity within reason itself, occasioned by 
our faith in rationality as an adequate (if not perfect) system of justification for 
everything we believe, think, and do. The incongruity lies in the single exception to 
rationality's scope as a system of justification: we cannot use rationality to justify our 
faith in rationality as a system of justification without circularity (720). Of course, as 
Nagel points out, what is remarkable about humanity in general is our capability to step 
back and acknowledge the very real possibility that everything we take seriously is 





 It is my contention that by situating the philosophical absurdity outlined by Nagel 
as a humorous incongruity, it is possible to understand the potential unjustifiability of all 
our convictions and beliefs (as long as we don't find the possibility too emotionally 
taxing) as comic in and of itself in addition to serving as the operational incongruity at 
the core of many kinds of humor. It would seem that if anything should be justifiable, the 
system we use to justify our actions and beliefs ought to be, but it isn't.  
 Here is a good example of a joke that highlights the way in which we provide 
ourselves with faulty justifications for the things that we believe but can't be sure of. 
Atheists and the devoutly religious are both groups that tend to hold strong convictions 
for which they can offer little to no definitive proof. This joke pokes fun at the lengths 
people are willing to go to find supporting evidence for their convictions.  
A little old Christian lady comes out onto her front porch every morning and 
shouts, “Praise the Lord!” And every morning the atheist next door yells back, 
"There is no God!” This goes on for weeks.  
 “Praise the Lord!” yells the lady.  
 “There is no God!” responds the neighbor. 
 As time goes by, the lady runs into financial difficulties and has trouble buying 
food. She goes out onto the porch and asks God for help with groceries, then says, 
“Praise the Lord!”  
 The next morning when she goes out onto the porch, there are the 
groceries she asked for. Of course, she shouts, 
 “ Praise the Lord!” The atheist jumps out from behind a bush and says,  
 “Ha! I bought those groceries. There is no God!” The lady looks at him 
and smiles. Turning her face to heavens, she shouts,  
 “Praise the Lord! Not only did you provide for me, Lord, you made Satan 
pay for the groceries!” (Cathcart, Klein, 99). 
 
This joke is amusing because it highlights the futility of arguing 'rationally' over an 
irresolvable dispute; neither party will ever be convinced by the other. Nevertheless we 
engage in these kinds of arguments all the time and can easily imagine the scene depicted 




fight is incongruous with the fundamental truth that neither can be sure of their own 
position let alone successfully convince the other.  George Carlin told a famous joke that 
is funny for similar reasons: "Tell people an invisible man in the sky created all things, 
they believe you. Tell them what you've painted is wet, they have to touch it to believe". 
Again, the funniness of this joke comes from highlighting the incongruity between the 
different epistemological standards some people use to evaluate the merit of their beliefs. 
On the one hand, being told that God exists is enough for some people to believe, but 
many of those same people want empirical verification before they believe the paint is 
wet.  
Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
  By this point I hope I have articulated clearly and thoroughly how incongruity 
theory operates as an analytic tool for understanding the comic. Additionally, I have 
shown incongruity theory's strength as an explanation for what gives a situation, object, 
or event the potential to be perceived as amusing as well as identifying a significant 
weakness in the account. Namely, that it provides an insufficient explanation for why a 
given subject is amused by a given incongruous object when there are so many examples 
of non-amusing incongruous perceptions. Though I do not claim to have solved this 
problem in its entirety (I wonder if such a solution is attainable), it is my assertion that 
the closer semblance a given incongruity bears to a non-incongruity, relative to a given 
subject's conceptual schema, the greater is the likelihood that that subject will be amused. 
Finally, I have discussed at some length the existence of a fundamental incongruity 




justification, and the persistent possibility that, in fact, these beliefs and systems rest on a 
foundation of assumptions. 
  Humorist Stephen Leacock wrote that the ultimate humor arises from, "the 
incongruity between the eager fret of our life and its final nothingness" (Morreall, 
"Taking Laughter Seriously", 124). There is, I believe a sense in which this is true. At the 
conclusion of his piece, Nagel writes that, "if sub specie aeternitatis1, there is no reason 
to believe that anything matters, then that doesn't matter either and we can approach our 
absurd lives with irony instead of despair" (727). The ultimate incongruity of human 
existence lies between zeal with which we believe in and trust in the rationality of the 
universe and the uncomfortable truth that we'll never know if doing so is justified. Louis 
C.K. employs this incongruity for the purposes of amusement in a particularly inspired 
bit. In it, he describes having protracted conversations with his six year old daughter in 
which she responds to every statement he makes with the question, "why?". He recounts 
a particular example to illustrate his daughter's insatiable desire for answers and her 
inability to accept anything. As he tries to explain (albeit somewhat tacitly), with 
increasing exasperation, that at the bottom of everything there is no satisfying answer to 
the fundamental why of existence, he highlights the incongruity outlined above. Though 
the transcription doesn't quite do the bit justice, here is the routine: 
 "Poppa, why can't we go outside?" 
 "Because it's raining." 
 "Why?" 
 "Well, water's coming out of the sky." 
 "Why?" 
 "Because it was in a cloud." 
 "Why?" 
 "Because clouds form when there's ... I don't know, vapor." 
                                                





 "I don't know, I don't know any more things, those are all the things I 
know!" 
 "Why?" 
 "Because I'm stupid, OK? I'm stupid." 
 "Why?" 
 "Because I didn't pay attention in school! I went to school but I didn't 
listen in class." 
 "Why?" 
 "Because I was high all the time, I smoked too much pot!" 
 "Why?" 
 "Because my parents gave me no guidance, they didn't give a shit!" 
 "Why?" 
 "Because they fucked in a car and had me and they resented me for taking 
their youth." 
 "Why?" 
 "Because they had bad morals, they just had no compass..." 
 "Why?" 
 "Because they had shitty parents, it just goes on and on like that!" 
 "Why?" 
 "Because, fuck it, we're alone in the universe! Nobody gives a shit about 
 us!" 
 
I'm going to stop here to be polite to you for a second, but this just goes on and on 
for hours and hours and it gets so weird and abstract... it's like: 
 
 "Why? 
 "Because some things are and some things are not!" 
 "Why?" 
  "Well because things that are not can't be!" 
 "Why?" 
 "Because then nothing wouldn't be! You can't have fuckin' nothing isn't! 
And everything is!" 
 "Why?" 
 "Because if nothing wasn't then there'd be fuckin' all kinds of shit that we 
don't... like giant ants with top hats dancing around. There's no room for all that 
stuff" 
 "Why?" 
 "Oh fuck you, eat your french-fries you little shit, goddammit!" 
 
 
 With comic brilliance this routine makes us laugh at the incongruity between the 
systems that we rely on and trust in and the fact that we don't truly understand any of 




a why that is unanswerable. It doesn't usually leave us stammering that, "you can't have 
nothing isn't because things that aren't not can't be!" but C.K.'s parody of the dissolution 
of rational inquiry when confronted with metaphysical issues beyond the realm of 
experience is striking both in its funniness and for the philosophical wisdom lurking 
beneath its surface. We can and will most likely continue to demand explanations from 
the world around us, but at no point will we be satisfied with the answers. Hume (1984) 
writes of investigating these issues that, "Fortunately...since reason is incapable of 
dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose and cures me of this 
philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some 
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterates these chimeras...And 
when after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they 
appear so cold and strain'd and ridiculous that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them 
any farther" (316). Amusement at the incongruity of life gives us a chance to take a 
breath and temporarily remove ourselves from the struggle to find meaning. In doing so 
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